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Border control is vital to the security of a nation and its citizens. All countries look at measures to improve the security
of their borders. But increasing security can bring a substantial ﬁnancial burden. In this study, we analyze the border secu-
rity problem of Turkey using a simulation approach. Our main objective is to ﬁnd more eﬃcient ways of improving border
control and security along Turkey’s land borders. To achieve this, we examine the structure of the border security system
and its major elements, examine the relationships between performance measures, and assess the eﬀectiveness of security
elements on each system performance measure. We also look into the issues of planned changes and additional resources,
and we evaluate new alternative system designs. The results of simulation experiments are analyzed by statistical methods.
 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Border control is vital to the security of a nation
and its citizens. International terrorism, worldwide
illegal immigration and refugee problems, and drug
and arms smuggling are of concern to all states.
Every country employs some measures to secure
its borders. Since today’s security systems depend
on technology and personnel, eﬀorts to increase
border security will result in substantial ﬁnancial
costs. Hence all states try to optimize their resources
while remaining eﬀective.0377-2217/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.040
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +90 312 290 1262; fax: +90 312
266 4126.
E-mail addresses: celik@bilkent.edu.tr (G. C¸elik), sabun@
bilkent.edu.tr (_I. Sabuncuog˘lu).The objective of this study is to identify the pos-
sible ways of increasing border control and eﬃ-
ciency of security along Turkey’s borders.
Speciﬁcally, we model the operational activities of
a border company supported by a battalion and
examine the existing system via simulation. First
we analyze the main structure and components of
the present system and to assess its eﬀectiveness
using the performance measures such as the ratio
of illegal inﬁltrations caught, degree of controllabil-
ity, and frequency of controlling. Second, we
attempt to understand the relationship between
security elements and performance measures. Third,
we study the eﬀect of each security element on
selected performance measures and determine the
degree of importance of each security element.
Fourth, we identify the factors that signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the performance measures and measure the.
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system environment. Finally, we evaluate new sys-
tem design alternatives to improve system perfor-
mance. In all of these stages, our aim is to ﬁnd
possible ways to increase border security in a cost
eﬀective manner.
Although the topic is important and vital to the
security of a nation, we could not ﬁnd any studies
in the literature that analyzed border security sys-
tems. There are several GAO (General Accounting
Oﬃce is the investigative arm of Congress in US)
and CRS (Congressional Research Service) reports
related to border control and security. In their
CRS report (June 18, 2001), William J. Krouse
(Analyst in Social Legislation; Domestic Social Pol-
icy Division) and Raphael F. Perl (Specialist in
International Aﬀairs; Foreign Aﬀairs, Defense,
and Trade Division) explain the importance of bor-
der security and propose some options to prevent
illegal entry into the United States. In GAO reports,
some precautions are proposed and evaluated.
These include: (1) concentrating personnel and tech-
nology resources, ﬁrst in the sectors having the high-
est level of illegal inﬁltration activity and moving to
the areas with lesser activity, (2) making maximum
use of physical barriers to deter entry along the bor-
der, (3) increasing the proportion of time border
patrol agents spend on patrol, and (4) identifying
the appropriate mix of technology and personnel
needed to control the border.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we deﬁne the problem and its scope. In
Section 3, we explain the model development pro-
cess. In Section 4, we examine the system behavior,
interactions between system components and per-
formance measures; and assess the eﬀects of each
security element on the selected performance mea-
sures. In Section 5, we present the results of the
experimental design to identify the signiﬁcant fac-
tors. In Section 6, we compare alternatives using
ranking and selection and multi-criteria decision-
making procedures. Finally, we give concluding
remarks and future research directions in Section 7.
2. Problem deﬁnition and system description
Turkey has 2852 km of land borders. Border
troops from the Land Forces have the task of
securing the borders; the General Staﬀ approves
troop organization. Each border battalion consists
of three border companies and one headquarters
company which both supports the activities of theborder battalion commanders and provides logisti-
cal support for border companies. Border compa-
nies consist of border platoons who execute
operational tasks. Border platoons (border posts)
are located along the borders; they are equipped
with technology and supported by personnel so
that they can execute their tasks in both peace
and war.
The border Security System consists of both
physical barriers and a border surveillance and con-
trol system. These complementary systems can be
used together or separately; the main factors aﬀect-
ing the use of these systems are the importance of
the region, the level of threat and the nature of
the terrain. Since the Border surveillance and control
system contains all active precautions against unau-
thorized entry into or exit from the country, it is the
core of the border security system. The main secu-
rity elements of this system are border patrols,
ambushes, sentries, thermal cameras and askarad.
We brieﬂy explain the elements as follows:
Border patrols: A patrol consists of three soldiers
from a border platoon that watches and controls a
speciﬁc section of the border. They depart according
to accomplish a task from the border posts. The
task occupies some time interval. Upon execution
of the task they return to their respective border
posts. They patrol the borders day and night.
Ambushes: An ambush is a concealed force that
captures a person crossing the border illegally.
Ambushes may be stationary or mobile. Stationery
ambush troops are stationed at one point; mobile
ambush troops work at diﬀerent points at diﬀerent
times through the night. Ambushers work only at
night.
Sentries: Sentries’ main task is to watch the bor-
ders and terrain of neighbor. They are on duty dur-
ing the day in watchtowers, constructed at speciﬁc
observation points along the borders.
Thermal cameras: A thermal camera system is an
infrared imaging system, which enables target detec-
tion, recognition and observation capabilities in all
weather conditions. The passive nature of such
imaging provides fully covert surveillance. They
have many advantages in military usages: they are
light, portable and quite; they can be repeated by
one man; they are unaﬀected by poor ﬁeld and
weather conditions; they provide excellent images.
Thermal cameras are used for border and port/har-
bor surveillance and protection of headquarters and
military zones. Thermal cameras are under the con-
trol of the border company and are used only at
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mobile.
Askarad: Askarad, ground surveillance radar, is
a new generation radar system. It is used for surveil-
lance, target acquisition and moving target classiﬁ-
cation, precision location of targets, plotting of
targets on a display, adjustment of artillery ﬁre,
guidance of small ground or airborne attack units,
and helicopter navigational particularly homing.
Askarads are operated both day and night and
again can be stationary or mobile.
Both the thermal camera and askarad are elec-
tronic surveillance systems. The main diﬀerence
between them is their range. Askarad is capable of
detecting targets 4–5 times farther a way the thermal
camera. All these security elements are used
together to achieve the highest possible security.
The problem is to use these resources in such a
way that border security in fact is increased. In
the next section, we discuss our approach to this
problem.
3. Model development
The border security system has several stochastic
elements and the military end-users want to see
how the system behaves over several performance
measures. The users also want the answers to sev-
eral ‘‘what if’’ questions that arise during opera-
tion. Therefore, we use simulation as a modelling
and analysis tool to study the border security
problem.
The conceptual model is the ﬁrst step in the sim-
ulation modelling process. At this stage, we deter-
mine the relevant elements of the system and their
interrelationships (Banks et al., 1996). In practice,
the border troops have many tasks beside border
security, but we will focus only on this operation.
Daytime border control is not a focus of this
study. When visibility is good, sentries stationed at
watchtowers can see wide sections of the border,
the control is almost too good. For this reason, ille-
gal inﬁltrations peak at night as terrorists, smug-
glers, refugees and enemy forces take advantage of
poor night visibility. Therefore, the full border secu-
rity system operates at night as does our model. In
our model, the entities are patrols, ambushes, ther-
mal cameras, askarads, illegal inﬁltrations and
zones. There are three main performance measures
that reﬂect the eﬀectiveness of the whole system.
These measures are determined by consulting the
army oﬃcials who plan the border control activities.1. Degree of controllability (DOC) is the percentage
of time that a zone being monitored by security
elements. The border is divided into small areas
or segments, are called zones. The percentage is
calculated for each zone and the average of all
zones is used as the performance measure.
2. Frequency of control (FOC) represents the num-
ber of time intervals that a zone is under control
by security elements. The average of all zones is
calculated for this performance measure.
3. Ratio of illegal inﬁltrations caught (ROIIC) mea-
sures the ratio of caught illegal inﬁltrations to the
actual total number for a given zone in 1-year
time period. The average of all zones is consid-
ered as the third performance measure.
For example, a particular zone is controlled suc-
cessively by a border patrol and ambush for the
duration of X and Y minutes, respectively. Assume
also that three illegal immigrations are attempted
but only one of them is caught in the total period
of time Z. In this example, DOC is equal to
(X + Y)/Z, FOC is equal to 2 (due to one patrol
and one ambush) and ROIIC is equal to 1/3 (one
of the three are caught).
Fig. 1 shows the input/output process of the
model. Some of the input variables are random vari-
ables. The list of these random variables and their
distribution functions are given in Table 1. In gen-
eral, we use historical data and taken from army
ﬁeld manuals. Analysis of historical data suggests
that an exponential distribution is suitable for mod-
elling the arrival process of illegal inﬁltrations. We
use a triangular distribution for the inﬁltration time
of each type of inﬁltration as suggested by the liter-
ature in the absence of data. The parameters of the
distributions are determined by using Border Ser-
vices Instructions (KKY 118-1, 1999) and by con-
sulting border troop commanders.
By examining the relationship between the ele-
ments of the system, we develop the logical model.
As seen in Fig. 2, it starts with the movement of
security elements from their locations and ends with
their return to their start locations. The random
arrival of illegal inﬁltrations is considered. The rela-
tions between these entities and events are presented
in Fig. 2 to clarify the logic of the model. In this ﬁg-
ure, departure of security elements from their loca-
tions by type and arrivals of illegal inﬁltrations are
presented. The rest of the ﬁgure is the general ﬂow-
chart model of the system. Security elements depart
their locations for duty according to weather condi-
X                         Y 
• Controllable
variables*
• Uncontrollable
variables*
   Simulation
     Model 
Degree of controllability 
(DOC) 
Frequency of controlling 
(FOC)
Ratio of illegal infiltrations 
caught (ROIIC) 
  System 
Y=f(X)
Fig. 1. The input/output process of the model.
Table 1
Random variables and their distribution functions
Random variables Distribution
functions
Arrivals of illegal inﬁltrations Exponential
Type of illegal inﬁltrations Discrete
Inﬁltration time for each type
of illegal inﬁltration
Triangular
Duty time of patrols Triangular
Duty time of ambush, thermal
camera and askarad
Triangular
Duty time before high-tech
equipment failure
Uniform
Weather conditions Discrete
Failures before and on duty Discrete
Determination of mobile or
stationary characteristics of duty
Discrete
Determination that patrols are
motorized or on-foot (for each
platoon)
Discrete
Determination that ambushes
have night-vision device or not
Discrete
The degree of use of high-tech
devices
Discrete
Determination of ﬁrst points
where each ambush is assigned
to perform its duty
Discrete
Determination of ﬁrst point
where thermal camera is assigned
to perform its duty
Discrete
Determination of ﬁrst point where
askarad is assigned to perform its duty
Discrete
Determination of next point where
thermal camera will continue to
perform its duty, if it is assigned
as mobile
Discrete
Determination of next point where
askarad will continue to perform its
duty, if it is assigned as mobile
Discrete
Determination of next points where
each ambush will continue to
perform its duty, if it is mobile
Discrete
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Meanwhile, type of duty (stationary or mobile)
and duty places are determined. Then, their rela-
tions are presented according to presence of other
elements in the zone or arrival of any security ele-
ment while other one is already in that zone. If secu-
rity elements complete their duty, they go back to
their home-based locations. Otherwise, new duty
places are assigned. This continues until each secu-
rity element completes its duty. The logical model
is coded in ARENA simulation system.
By examining the relationship between the ele-
ments of the system, we develop the logical model.
As seen in Fig. 2, it starts with movement of security
elements from their locations and ends with return-
ing to their start locations. The arrivals of illegal
inﬁltrations are considered. The relations between
these entities and events are presented in Fig. 2 to
clarify the logic of the model. In this ﬁgure, depar-
ture of security elements from their locations by
type and arrivals of illegal inﬁltrations are pre-
sented. The rest of the ﬁgure is the general ﬂowchart
model of the system. Security elements leave their
locations for duty according to weather conditions
and failure conditions of high-tech devices.
Meanwhile, type of duty (stationary or mobile)
and duty places are determined. Their relationships
are given according to presence of other elements in
the zone or arrival of any security element while
other one is already in that zone. If security ele-
ments complete their duty, they go back to their
home-based locations. Otherwise, new duty places
are assigned. This continues until each security ele-
ment completes its duty.
The logical model is coded in ARENA simula-
tion system. ARENA is based on the SIMAN dis-
crete event simulation language. In the ARENA
system, entities (dynamic components of the system)
Thermal
Patrols  Camera
Separate each  
Element by type.
Create illegal 
infiltrations.
illegal                       
Ambushes Infiltrations
        Askarad 
GENERAL FOR EACH 1,2,3,4,5 
1,2,3,4,5
bad 
1   2   3   4   5    
well 
yes 
          yes
no
no 
yes 
stationary 
yes
 no 
no
moving
 1 2    3  4   5 
no                           yes
Departure  of the security 
elements from their 
locations for duty.
23
4
5
1
Not go on
duty
Failure
before
duty?
Type of 
duty?
Select  where 
to go 
Which
zone/zone to be 
controlled? 
Where to go? 
Which
element?
Failure
on duty? 
Not go duty 
Other
elements
coming the 
zones ? 
Other 
elements in 
the zones? 
Which
element?
Go on duty 
Complete 
duty?
Return to 
location
Where to go for 
next duty? 
Check the 
weather? 
Dispose 
Dispose 
Dispose
Perform duty 
accordingly
Perform duty 
accordingly
Fig. 2. The simpliﬁed ﬂowchart of the model.
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ing to the process plan in the model operational
logic. While entities are moving in the system, ran-
dom events are triggered and statistics are collected.During the model execution, the state and output
variables are also updated. In our implementation,
we use the elements of the border security system
(askarads, ambushes, etc.) to model dynamic enti-
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statistics of three performance measures are
reported as the model output.
3.1. Veriﬁcation/validation of the model
We use the techniques proposed by Balcı (1998)
in the validation process. For veriﬁcation, we ﬁrst
use the Arena trace option to see if the program
runs as intended. The border security system model
contains four border platoons, each of which is
modeled by a diﬀerent subprogram. We check each
subprogram individually. We also run the simula-
tion model to test model behavior under certain
conditions. Additionally, we employ an animation
tool to see the consistency of the model behavior.
A view of the animation page is given in Fig. 3.
In the validation process, we use the techniques
in Department of Army Pamphlet 5-11 (1999). We
ﬁrst use Fault/Failure insertion test. This test is used
to observe if abnormal behavior results from a
faulty input (incorrect model component). To
implement, we add a new security element that is
much more eﬀective than a thermal camera (incor-
rect model component). As seen in Fig. 4a, the
degree of controllability jumped to 80% from 25%
of thermal camera.
Secondly, we change the operation of thermal
camera and askarad. In the new setting, they are
positioned at one place to control limited areas
(incorrect behavior of a model component). As seenFig. 3. An animation screen froin Fig. 4b, the DOC deteriorates about 30% display-
ing the invalid behavior of the model as expected.
We also compare the simulation results with the
results of manual calculations to validate the simu-
lation model. As seen in Fig. 5, the results of manual
calculations are slightly higher than the simulation
results. This is due to the fact that the same zones
can be controlled simultaneously by diﬀerent secu-
rity elements in the real system (i.e. the eﬀects of dif-
ferent elements can be overlapping). When the
simulation model encounters such a situation, it
takes only one of the security elements into account.
On the other hand, manual calculation cannot con-
sider such overlaps and hence it reports higher val-
ues. We also conduct a number of experiments by
systematically changing the values of model input
variables and parameters over the range of the input
parameters. We do not observe any unexpected
eﬀect of input variables on outputs. In general the
results are as expected.
4. Simulation results: Preliminary analysis
We set the sample size by adjusting simulation
run-length and the number of replications. To
achieve the desired accuracy (10% relative preci-
sion), we ﬁrst run the simulation model for ﬁve rep-
lications for diﬀerent run-lengths. We use DOC as
the performance measure and calculated point and
interval estimators (i.e., mean and conﬁdence inter-
val). The results indicate that half-length as anm the simulation model.
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Fig. 4. Fault/failure insertion test.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of simulation model results and calculations
made by hand.
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Since our aim is to achieve the desired accuracy in
the worst-case situation, we decided to use the
half-length of a zone with the maximum half-length
of all the zones for a given run-length. Fig. 6 pre-
sents the results at various run-lengths. Note that
the curve gets ﬂat after a run-length of 6-month, this0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
1 day (zone66)
1 week (zone78)
1 month (zone63)
3 months (zone12)
6 months (zone21)
1 year (zone78)
2 years (zone70)
3 years (zone37)
Run-lengths and zones that have max half-width
 M
ax
 h
al
f-w
id
th
Fig. 6. Determination of run-length for degree of controllability.means that variance of the estimator stabilizes with
this sample size.
After consulting with border troop commanders
to set the values of the desired precision level), we
calculate number of replications required to obtain
an absolute precision 0.02 (approximately 10% rela-
tive precision) for diﬀerent simulation run-lengths,
starting from 6-month run-length for degree of con-
trollability. To determine sample sizes, we use the
two-stage procedure suggested by Law and Kelton
(1991). The results indicate that 1-year run-length
and 10 replications is enough to achieve the desired
accuracy. Using these sample sizes, we conduct the
simulation experiments and obtain the point and
interval estimators for each performance measure
at various conﬁdence levels, e.g., 90%, 95%, and
99%. When the resulting conﬁdence intervals are
actually examined, it is observed that both absolute
and relative precisions for each performance mea-
sure are satisﬁed (Table 2).
4.1. Analysis of simulation results
After developing the simulation model and deter-
mining sample size, we begin to analyze system
behavior for each performance. First, we examine
the eﬀects of the security elements on each perfor-Table 2
Desired precisions
Performance
measure
desired
precision
Degree of
controllability
Frequency of
controlling
Ratio of
illegal
inﬁltrations
caught
Absolute precision 0.02 100 0.025
Relative precision 10% 5% 5%
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iments for DOC are given in Fig. 7a. Note that
some of the zones have a higher degree of controlla-
bility than others; meaning control is not uniform
along the border; this is due to variability in using
security elements in the diﬀerent zones. To explain
the behavior of DOC, we also run the simulation
model with only one security element. The distribu-
tions of DOC in this case are given in Fig. 7b–e. In
general, ambush shows the most variability in DOC,
since they are used only uniformly along the bor-
ders. Note also that the behavior of thermal cam-
eras and askarad is similar and falls in between
ambush and patrols. This is because thermal cam-
eras and askarad provide security for wider piece
of the border than they are stationed. LookingDistribution of Degree of Controllability
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Fig. 7. Behavior of the system for degree of controllability: (a) degre
distribution of DOC (using only patrol), (c) distribution of DOC (using o
(e) distribution of DOC (using only thermal camera).again at overall eﬀects of all security elements in
Fig. 7a, we note that the DOC measure is mostly
aﬀected by the ambushes. The spikes that are
observed are due to the fact that zones in the neigh-
borhood of two consecutive sections of the border
can be covered twice and hence the performance
improves for these zones.
Fig. 8 provides the results for FOC. Again, distri-
bution of FOC is not uniform along the border due
to the diﬀerent mobility characteristics of each secu-
rity element. We note that zones 25–60 have lower
FOC than other zones. This diﬀerence is due to dif-
ferent patrol capacity; the 1st and 4th platoons have
the patrol capacity for two sides (patrols on two
routes simultaneously) whereas the 2nd and 3rd pla-
toons can only patrol one side. Because the mostgree of Controllability
41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81
ones
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Fig. 8. Behavior of the system for frequency of controlling.
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conclude that the FOC measure along the border-
line is mostly aﬀected by patrols.
Fig. 9 shows the behavior of the system for
ROIIC. The distribution of ROIIC is a similar
shape to the distribution of FOC because of the
decreased patrol capacity in zones 25–60. We also
compare the distributions of DOC and ROIIC
and note that ROIIC is low where DOC is low.
These observations raise the question of the poten-
tial relationships between DOC, FOC, and ROIIC.
4.2. Relationship between DOC, FOC and ROIIC
Looking ﬁrst at DOC, FOC and ROIIC, we con-
struct a graph that displays the results of each per-
formance measure at each zone. As seen in
Fig. 10, there is a high correlation between these
two measures; ROIIC increases as DOC increases.
We also conducted simulation experiments to
further study the relationship between DOC and
ROIIC; this involves changing the capacity of secu-
rity elements (patrols, ambushes, thermal cameras,
and askarad). Fig. 11 displays the relationshipDistribution of illegal infiltrations caught
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Fig. 9. Behavior of the system for ratio of illegal inﬁltrations
caught.between DOC, ROIIC and the costs incurred at var-
ious capacities of security elements. Here, the capac-
ity is adjusted by a multiple of the base capacity. As
expected, additional capacity of security elements
improves DOC. However, the main purpose of
increasing DOC is to improve ROIIC. But improve-
ment in ROIIC is not proportional to increase in
DOC. This is because some parts of the border can-
not be controlled with high-tech devices (askarad,
thermal cameras) due to diﬃcult terrain. Increasing
the quantity of high-tech devices, does not necessar-
ily prevent inﬁltrations; beyond the appropriate
number, the additional costs of high-tech devices
cannot be justiﬁed. ROIIC can be maximized by sta-
tioning ambush troops at those parts of the border
that cannot be monitored by high-tech devices.
Second, we examined the relationship between
FOC and ROIIC by changing the capacity of
patrols. As can be seen in Fig. 12, increasing the
capacity of patrols improves FOC. We noted that
improvement in FOC and ROIIC is not symmetri-
cal due to the low probability of catching illegal
inﬁltrators such as terrorist or enemy special force.
These inﬁltrators are well trained and can cross
the border quickly in small groups. Thus, increasing
the number of patrols does not necessarily prevent
inﬁltrations. Border security planners must decide
on the appropriate number of patrols, and then
implement precautions such as building physical
obstacles or increasing the mobility of patrol. Phys-
ical obstacles prolong time needed to inﬁltrate and
increasing the mobility of patrols improves FOC.
Both of these precautions increase ROIIC.
4.3. Analysis of the eﬀect of each security element
One of our goals in this study is to assess the
eﬀectiveness of the security elements for each per-
formance measure. In the military, it is important
for a commander to know his troops’ capabilities.
Commanders of border troops want to know the
capabilities of security elements for protection of
borders to determine priorities for maintenance
and training activities accordingly.
We run a factorial design to assess the eﬀect of
each security element. We consider four factors:
patrols, ambushes, thermal camera, and askarad.
As seen in Table 3, the high and low values of each
element reﬂect whether they are present in the secu-
rity system or not.
The results of ANOVA indicate that patrols are
the most eﬀective factor in ROIIC (see Fig. 13a).
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a lesser degree. For DOC, each security element has
the equal impact (Fig. 13b). For FOC, patrols havea big positive eﬀect whereas the other factors
(ambush, thermal camera and askarad) have nega-
tive eﬀects.
Table 3
Factors eﬀecting border security system
Factor Factor
description
1 +1
a Patrols No patrol in
the system
Patrols are typically in
the system
b Ambushes No ambush in
the system
Ambushes are typically
in the system
c Thermal
camera
No thermal
camera in
system
Thermal camera is
typically in the system
d Askarad No askarad in
the system
Askarad is typically in
the system
Table 4
Factors and levels of 25 factorial design
Factor Factor description 1 +1
a The degree of use of
high-tech devices
40% 95%
b The degree of use of
night-vision tools
25% 75%
c Determination of
stationary or mobile
characteristics of duty
30% 70%
d The degree of use of
motorized patrols
15% 70%
e Duty time of patrols 3 hours 4 hours
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Fig. 13. Main eﬀect diagrams of security elements for each
performance measure.
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factor has more signiﬁcant eﬀect. In the statistical
analysis process, we employ the paired-t test to see
if each security element has signiﬁcant impact on
the performance measures. The results indicate that
each security element has signiﬁcant eﬀect on each
performance measure.
5. Analysis of operating policies
In this section, we examine various operating
policies related to all the security elements. The pol-
icies under consideration are: (1) the degree of use of
high-tech devices, (2) the degree of use of night-
vision tools, (3) whether elements are stationary or
mobile, (4) the degree of use of motorized patrols,
and (5) duty time of patrols. We set these factors
and their levels according to Border Services
Instruction KKY 118-1 (1999) and by consultation
with border troop commanders.
Border Services Instruction recommends infre-
quent use of high-tech devices in order to extend
their lifetime. Since failure of these devices is an
undesired situation for commanders, some of them
seldom use the devices. On the other hand, the pro-
tection of borders requires high-tech devices. The
above statements are valid for night-vision tools
and motorized patrols. Therefore, we set the low
and high values of factors a, b and d according to
how frequently the devices are used; factor levels
indicate the probability of use of the high-tech
devices or night-vision tools for duty of that day.
The commander also determines whether elements
will be used in a stationary or mobile form (factor
c in Table 4); this varies with the number of critical
zones and with terrain. The levels of the factor indi-
cate the percentage of the duty that will be mobile.
The maximum time that patrols can spend on bor-
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Instruction. But they can also have 3 hours patrols.
The factors and their levels are given in Table 4.
We implement a full 25 factorial design with ten
replications at each design point (factor combina-
tion) to ensure randomization. To identify signiﬁ-
cant factors and their interactions, we use
ANOVA (Analysis of variance) technique and a
SPSS statistical package program. First, we check
two main assumptions (homogeneity of variance
and normality). The results of Bartlett’s test and
Levene’s test (Montgomery, 1992) indicate that the
common variance assumption is satisﬁed. By plot-
ting scatter plots of variance and residuals, and
drawing histograms of residuals compared with nor-
mal, and normal probability plots of residuals, we
also veriﬁed the normality assumption.
The results indicate that each main factor is sig-
niﬁcant. As seen in Fig. 14a, the degree of use of
high-tech devices (factor a) has the greatest impact
on DOC (a steeper the line means that a factor
has a more signiﬁcant eﬀect). This is because the
high-tech devices are used more frequently. When
the high-tech devices is high, zones are under con-
trol for longer time periods and DOC increases
about 28%. As seen in Fig. 14b, the degree of use
of motorized patrols (factor d) has also the greatest
eﬀect on FOC (38%) because of their high mobility
(see Fig. 14b).
Factor d also has a signiﬁcant impact on ROIIC.
This is because the improvement in FOC causes an
increase in ROIIC of about 13% (Fig. 14c). When
factor a (degree of use of high-tech devices) is at a
high level, DOC increases 28% (Fig. 14a); this pro-
duces a slight improvement (5%) in ROIIC
(Fig. 14c).
The magnitude and direction of the factor eﬀects
on each performance measure are given in Table 5.
The results indicate that border commanders and
security planners should emphasize the mobility of
security elements (especially patrols). FOC
improves 38% when the use of motorized patrols
is at a high level; this increases ROIIC about 13%.
Increasing the mobility of patrols not only improves
security along the border but also deters
inﬁltrations.
The use of high-tech devices (factor a) increases
DOC and ROIIC 28% and 5%, respectively. Note
that factor b (use night-vision tools) also improves
DOC by 10% and ROIIC by 3%. This clearly indi-
cates that technology has a positive impact on bor-
der security. Thus, we recommend that bordercommanders use high-tech devices frequently and
emphasize the maintenance of these devices. We
also observe that factor e (duty time of patrols)
has some positive eﬀects, but these are marginal:
6% for DOC and 1% for ROIIC. The other factors
(use of motorized patrols and stationary vs. mobil-
ity) have little eﬀect on DOC.
There are four signiﬁcant interactions on ROIIC.
These are between factors a–d, b–d, e–d and a–b–d–
e. There is an interaction between factors a and d
since the eﬀect of factor d on ROIIC depends on
the level chosen for factor a. When the use of
high-tech devices is high, zones is monitored longer
and this decreases the control of zones by patrols.
Thus, the eﬀect of factor d on ROIIC is less when
factor a is at high value and the eﬀect of factor d
on ROIIC is greater when factor a is at its low
value. Interactions b–d and e–d can be explained
by the same reasoning.
There are two signiﬁcant interactions on DOC.
These are between factors a–b and a–e. These two
interactions have the positive eﬀect on DOC. The
eﬀect of factor b on DOC depends on the level cho-
sen for factor a. When the use of high-tech devices is
high, the zones will be under control longer and this
increases the probability of taking the same zones
under control by ambushes and patrols. Thus, the
eﬀect of factor b on DOC is less when factor a is
at its high value and the eﬀect of factor b on DOC
is more when factor a is at its low value. The inter-
action a–e can be explained by the same reasoning.
Finally, there are four signiﬁcant interactions on
FOC. These are between factors a–c, a–b, b–c and
b–e. These interactions can be interpreted as in the
case of ROIIC.
6. Alternative system designs
In this section, we propose and test new alterna-
tives to improve system performance using ranking/
selection and multi-criteria decision-making proce-
dures. Since improvements in the border security
system can be costly, we include the cost aspect in
addition to the regular performance measures:
DOC, FOC, and ROIIC. Speciﬁcally, we will
attempt to answer the following research questions:
• If coordination is established between security
elements, how much does it aﬀect the perfor-
mance measures?
• How much do additional high-tech devices aﬀect
the performance measures?
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Fig. 14. Main eﬀect diagrams of factors for each performance measure.
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ferent criteria?• What is the eﬀect of high mobility of patrols on
system performance?
Table 5
Eﬀects of factors on performance measures
Performance
measures
Signiﬁcant factors Improvement
(%)
Degree of
controllability
a (the degree of use of
high-tech devices)
28
b (the degree of use of
night-vision tools)
10
c (determination of
stationary or mobile
characteristics of duty)
1
d (the degree of use of
motorized patrols)
1
e (duty time of patrols) 6
Frequency of
controlling
a (the degree of use of
high-tech devices)
8
b (the degree of use of
night-vision tools)
3
c (determination of
stationary or mobile
characteristics of duty)
4
d (the degree of use of
motorized patrols)
38
e (duty time of patrols) 4
Ratio of illegal
inﬁltrations caught
a (the degree of use of
high-tech devices)
5
b (the degree of use of
night-vision tools)
3
c (determination of
stationary or mobile
characteristics of duty)
1
d (the degree of use of
motorized patrols)
13
e (duty time of patrols) 1
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1. Benchmark system: The existing system.
2. A border security system in which all patrols are
motorized: In the previous section, we observed
that ROIIC improves as FOC increases. We also
note that FOC increases with an increase in
motorized patrols.Table 6
Results of all pair-wise comparisons and Rinott’s procedure
Procedures Performance measures Ranking
1
All pair-wise comparisons DOC Alt 6
FOC Alt 2, 5
ROIIC Alt 2, 5
Rinott’s procedure DOC Alt 6
FOC Alt 2
ROIIC Alt 53. A system with one additional askarad and one
additional thermal camera: These high-tech
devices make it possible to control a wider sec-
tion of border.
4. A system with coordinated security elements: In
the present system, overlaps occur when security
elements monitor the same zones. We prevent
these overlaps by improving coordination
between security elements.
5. A system with coordinated elements: This is a
combination of the second and the fourth
alternatives.
6. A system with coordination and one additional
askarad and thermal camera.
6.1. Evaluation of alternatives by using ranking
and selection procedures
Since there are six alternatives, we have 15 pair-
wise comparisons of the alternatives. We apply the
ranking and the Rinott selection procedure. We ﬁrst
determine the required number of replications for
each alternative and then select the best system.
The results of Rinott’s procedure are summarized
in Table 6.
In general, the second and the ﬁfth alternatives
are better than the others for ROIIC and FOC. A
system where all patrols are motorized and coordi-
nation is established between security elements is
the most eﬀective. On the other hand, for DOC
Alternative 6 is best and Alternative 3 is second.
A coordinated system with extra high-tech devices
provides DOC at its highest level. Even though
the relative rankings of alternatives change for
diﬀerent performance measure, all the proposed
alternatives provide better border security than the
existing system (Alternative 1). This indicates
that all alternatives, which improve system eﬃ-
ciency, should be considered by security planners.2 3 4 5 6
Alt 3 Alt 5 Alt 1, 2, 4
Alt 1, 4 Alt 3, 6
Alt 6 Alt 3 Alt 1, 4
Alt 3 Alt 5 Alt 4 Alt 2 Alt 1
Alt 5 Alt 1 Alt 4 Alt 3 Alt 6
Alt 2 Alt 6 Alt 3 Alt 4 Alt 1
Table 7
Results of each alternative for each criterion
Criteria
Alternatives
Ratio of
illegal
inﬁltrations
caught
Degree of
controllability
Frequency
of
controlling
Costa
1 0.53 0.21 2046.64 0.04
2 0.63 0.22 3153.56 0.055
3 0.56 0.28 1877.88 0.075
4 0.53 0.22 2045.77 0.04
5 0.63 0.22 3146.43 0.055
6 0.57 0.29 1865.71 0.075
a Costs of alternatives are calculated as million dollars for 1-
year time period (note that costs are based on one thermal camera
(0.13 million dollars), price of one askarad (0.24 million dollars)
and amount of fuel needed for motorized patrols).
Table 8
Utility matrix
Alternatives Ratio of
illegal
inﬁltrations
caught
Degree of
controllability
Frequency of
controlling
Cost
1 0.42 0.53 0.70 2.36
2 2.50 0.57 2.80 1.07
3 0.76 2.52 0.50 0.39
4 0.48 0.62 0.70 2.37
5 2.60 0.67 2.79 1.07
6 0.97 3.03 0.50 0.39
Table 9
Weight matrix
Ratio of
illegal
inﬁltrations
caught
Degree of
controllability
Frequency
of controlling
Cost
Weights
before
normalization
1.62 0.62 0.74 1.31
Weights
after
normalization
0.38 0.15 0.17 0.30
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make coordination between security elements; as we
utilize more high-tech devices, coordination
becomes more important for both DOC and
ROIIC.
6.2. Implementation of the geometric mean
technique for multi-criteria decision-making
Since the ranking of alternatives diﬀers for each
performance measure, in this section we consider
all these criteria and the cost to compare the alterna-
tives. In this multi-criteria decision-making environ-
ment, we implement the geometric mean technique.
First, we construct our hierarchy tree as seen in
Fig. 15.
In the second step, we compare the alternatives
for each criterion. Speciﬁcally, we construct matri-
ces based on the simulation results (Table 7). In
the third step, we form a utility matrix by taking
the geometric means of each row of matrices. Mean-
while, we construct a weight matrix by taking the
geometric means of each row of pair-wise compari-
son matrices of criteria and normalizing the results.
In Tables 8 and 9, the utility matrix and weight
matrix (before and after normalization) are
presented.
As the last step, we take the weight powers of
each alternative row in the utility matrix and calcu-
late values for each alternative. Then we normalize
the values and obtain the ﬁnal ranking of alterna-
tives as presented in Table 10.
As seen in Table 10, Alternative 5 is the best sys-
tem. It shows us the importance of motorized type
of patrols and coordination between security ele-
ments in the system. The fact Alternative 4 is ranked
third also underscores the importance of coordina-
tion. On the other hand, alternatives that need addi-
tional high-tech devices (Alternatives 6 and 3) are
not chosen because of their high costs. It is clear
that if new high-tech devices are added to the sys-                       Goal: Rank the alternatives 
Criteria: Ratio of illegal  Degree of Frequency of    Cost 
infiltrations caught controllability             controlling
Alternatives: 1  2     3     4    5    6   1  2     3     4    5   6   1   2     3   4    5   6   1   2     3    4   5    6 
Fig. 15. Hierarchy tree of alternatives and criteria.
Table 10
Ranking of alternatives
Ranking Alternatives Values
1 Alternative 5 0.258841
2 Alternative 2 0.249674
3 Alternative 4 0.13541
4 Alternative 1 0.126509
5 Alternative 6 0.121378
6 Alternative 3 0.108188
Table 11
Factors aﬀecting the performance measures
Performance
measures
Signiﬁcant
factors
Improvementa
Ratio of illegal
inﬁltrations
caught
a, b, c, d, e 5%, 3%, 1%, 13%, 1%
Degree of
controllability
a, b, c, d, e 28%, 10%, 1%, 1%, 6%
Frequency of
controlling
a, b, c, d, e 8%, 3%, 4%, 38%, 4%
a Improvement indicates the change in performance measure
when we change the factor from its low level to high level: (a) the
degree of use of high-tech devices; (b) the degree of use of night-
vision tools; (c) determination of stationary or mobile charac-
teristics of duty; (d) the degree of use of motorized patrols; (e)
duty time of patrols.
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rity elements.
7. Concluding remarks and future research topics
In this paper, we study the Turkish border secu-
rity system via simulation to identify possible ways
of increasing border control and security along the
land borders. Speciﬁcally, we try to: (1) understand
the behavior of the system, (2) observe the relation-
ships between security elements and performance
measures and the relationship between diﬀerent per-
formance measures, (3) ﬁnd out the eﬀect of each
security element on the performance measures, (4)
analyze factors that the eﬀect the performance mea-
sures, (5) investigate system responses, when
changes are made in the system or new resources
are added to the system, and (6) evaluate diﬀerent
alternatives to improve the performance measures,
using ranking-selection and multi-criteria decision-
making procedures.
We analyze the outputs by using three perfor-
mance measures: (1) ratio of illegal inﬁltrations
caught, (2) degree of controllability, and (3) fre-
quency of controlling. The main conclusions from
our study are as follows:
1. DOC, FOC and ROIIC are not uniform along
the border. This is due to the diﬀerent use of
security elements in diﬀerent zones and to
the varying mobility characteristics of security
elements. This suggests that we can adjust
DOC by the ﬂexible use of security elements.
We can also higher levels of control on the
critical zones of the border. Ambushes are
the most appropriate means for high-level
control of critical zones. Therefore, the train-
ing of ambushes is important.
2. Patrols are the main security element in FOC.
Therefore, their mobility should be increased
by increasing the number of motorized
patrols.3. It is diﬃcult to catch enemy special forces and
terrorists. To improve the probability of cap-
turing these inﬁltrators, these should be
emphasis on building physical obstacles along
the borders; these obstacles usually increase
inﬁltration time.
4. There is a direct relation between DOC and
ROIIC. But, ROIIC does not improve propor-
tionally to DOC; it does not necessarily pre-
vent inﬁltrations on the border by increasing
the number of high-tech devices. We know
that more high-tech devices increase DOC.
Therefore, we need to identify the appropriate
number of high-tech devices for each border
troop and ambushes must be used for policing
the zones that cannot be monitored by high-
tech devices.
5. There is also a direct relation between FOC
and ROIIC, but ROIIC does not improve pro-
portional to FOC. Therefore, border security
planners must identify the appropriate capac-
ity of patrol and precautions such as increas-
ing the mobility of patrols and building
physical obstacles must be taken to maximize
ROIIC. Such precautions also prevent inﬁltra-
tions along the border.
6. The presence of each security element (patrols,
ambushes, thermal cameras, and askarad) has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on each performance mea-
sure when compared with its absence from
the system.
7. All factors have signiﬁcant eﬀects on each of
the performance measures (Table 11). On the
basis of these results, border troops have to
use high-tech devices more frequently, increase
Table 12
Alternative description and ranking of alternatives
Ranking Alternative Alternative description Value
1 Alternative 5 A system where
coordination is
established and
all patrols are
motorized
0.258
2 Alternative 2 A system where
all patrols are
motorized
0.249
3 Alternative 4 A system where
coordination is
established between
security elements
0.136
4 Alternative 1 Benchmark system 0.126
5 Alternative 6 A system where
coordination is
established and
one more askarad
and one more
thermal camera added
0.122
6 Alternative 3 A system with one
more askarad and
one more thermal
camera
0.109
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of all security elements to increase the security
of land borders.
8. Another way of increasing border security is
to establish coordination between security ele-
ments. Coordination increases degree of con-
trollability by preventing the monitoring of
the same zones by two or more security ele-
ments at the same time.
9. When all criteria are considered. Alternative 5
is best set (Table 12).
10. Before making investments or changes in prac-
tice to increase border security, we should ana-
lyze such changes in terms of performance
measures and costs for each border troop.
Thus, the requirements of each border troop
are evaluated more accurately leading to more
useful investments.
Finally, the following topics can be investigated
in future studies. First, border security should be
analyzed in a situation of strained relations with a
neighboring country (not war) by considering the
troops located very near to borders. Second, we
analyzed border security system at night; it couldalso be analyzed in daylight. Third, one of the main
tasks of border troops is the collection of intelli-
gence by closely watching the terrain of neighboring
country; research can be conducted on this task of
border troops. Finally the logistical activities and
communication systems of border troops can be
analyzed.
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